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THE ILLUSORY STATUTORY BASIS OF
SEC RULE 2(e)
Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or Commission)' in 19342 to enforce federal securities laws and to regulate
trading in securities.' Congress noted the national public interest in
creating reputable securities markets and vested the SEC with the authority to prescribe rules and regulations as required to foster integrity in
securities transactions. 4 Pursuant to congressional authorization, the SEC
established a set of Rules of Practice.' In 1935, the SEC promulgated rule
2(e) of the Rules of Practice,' which provided for the regulation and
discipline of professionals who "appear or practice ' 7 before the
- See 15 U.S.C. S78d (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (creation of Securities and Exchange Commission). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is composed of
five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. See generally
Gadsby, The Securitiesand Exchange Commission, 11 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 833 (1970).
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, S 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. % 78a-78111 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b-78d (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (authority and jurisdiction of SEC).
Congress established the SEC in the wake of the Great Depression and vested the Commission with broad powers to perfect the national market system for securities and to safeguard
the rights of the investing public. Id. § 78b. Congress gave the SEC power to make rules
and regulations "necessary and appropriate" to implement the SEC's statutory obligations.
See id. § 78w(a)(1); infra text accompanying notes 149-52 (necessary and appropriate
requirement).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1976) (SEC general rulemaking power). The SEC cannot
use its general rulemaking power to effect policy objectives contrary to congressional policy.
See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268,
280-81 (1969)); infratext accompanying notes 149-52 (necessary and appropriate requirement).
See 17 C.F.R. § 201.1-.28 (1982) (SEC Rules of Practice).
6 See id. § 201.2(e). SEC rule 2(e) provides in part that:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess
the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character
or integrity or to have enaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or
(iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
provision of the Federal securities laws, (15 U.S.C. § 77a-80b-20 (1976)), or the rules
and regulations thereunder.
Id. 5 201.2(e)(1). See generally Cheek, ProfessionalResponsibility and Self-Regulation of the
SecuritiesLawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597 (1975) (rule 2(e) effects upon securities lawyer
self-regulation); Matthews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 30 Bus.
LAW. 105 (1975) (rule 2(e) applications); Johnson, The Dynamics ofSECRule 2(e): A Crisisfor
the Bar, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 629 (1975) (rule 2(e) procedures explained); Comment, SEC
DisciplinaryRules and the FederalSecuritiesLaws: The Regulation,Role and Responsibilities
of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J. 969 (1972) (same).
' See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1982). The SEC did not define what exactly the rule 2(e)
language "appearing or practicing" before the Commission entails. Id. The SEC does, however,
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Commission Additionally, rule 2(e) established an SEC practitioners' bar
and required that attorneys join the SEC bar before appearing or practicing before the Commission.9 From 1935 to 1938, the SEC used rule 2(e)
to regulate only those attorneys who appeared before the Commission
in a representative capacity."0 Nonrepresentative attorneys acting as filing agents or policy advisors were immune from rule 2(e) prosecution."
In 1938, the Commission eliminated the requirement of membership in
the SEC bar 2 and broadly construed the "appear or practice" language
in rule 2(e), 13 transforming rule 2(e) into a device for the regulation of all
attorneys who act on behalf of clients in securities-related transactions. 4
From 1935 until 1970, the SEC premised rule 2(e) liability upon atdefine "practice" in rule 2(g) as including the transaction of business with the Commission
and the preparation of papers and opinion letters for SEC files. See id. S 201.2(g); see also
Ferrara, Administrative DisciplinaryProceedings UnderRule 2(e), 36 Bus. LAW. 1807,1810-11
(1981). Former SEC General Counsel Ferrara contends that the SEC should consider the
nexus that exists between the attorney practitioner's conduct and the SEC's administrative
processes before determining, pursuant to rule 2(e), that the attorney appeared or practiced before the Commission. Ferrara, supra, at 1810-11; see also Dolin, SEC Rule 2(d) After
Carter-Johnson: Toward a Reconciliationof Purpose and Scope, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 331, 347-55
(1982). The SEC should define appearing or practicing narrowly to include only direct interactions and formal presentations before the Commission. Dolin, supra,at 347-55. But
see remarks of Edward F. Greene, General Counsel of the SEC to the New York Lawyers'
Association, SEC DisciplinaryProceedingsAgainst Lawyers Reviewed, 187 N.Y.L.J. 15 at
1, col. 2. (Jan. 22, 1982) Greene argues that the SEC should define appearing or practicing.
broadly to include all possible situations in which an attorney practitioner can disrupt the
integrity of the SEC's administrative processes. Id.
See 17 C.F.R. S 2012(e) (1982) (SEC rule 2(e)).
See Rule II(h), [1935] SEC ANN. REPT. 45-46 (original version of SEC rule 2(e)); see also
Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 987, 987-88 (1980) (SEC bar membership
requirement).
"1 See 1 FED. REG. 1753 (1938). While the SEC practitioner's bar was in operation the
Commission could, in theory, discipline only attorneys who erred while appearing on behalf
of clients before the Commission. Id. The SEC did not, however, institute any rule 2(e)
proceedings against attorneys during the period from 1935 to 1938. See In re Keating,
Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982 (July 2, 1979), reprinted
in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,994 (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting) (SEC brought first rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney in 1950); see also In re
Fleischman, 37 S.E.C. 832, 833 (1950) (first rule 2(e) proceeding brought against attorney).
" See 1 FED. REG. 1753 (1938) (original rule 2(e) requiring membership in securities bar
only applied to attorneys who appeared on behalf of clients); see also supra note 10 (narrow
scope of rule 2(e) regulation from 1935 to 1938).
" See Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938), reprinted in 9 FED. REG. 1584
(1938) (SEC amendment to rule 2(e) deleting requirement that practitioner attorneys be
members of SEC bar).
" See Dolin, supra note 7, at 347-55 (explaining SEC's broad construction of the "appear or practice" language); see also supra note 7 (possible constructions of "appear or practice" language).
" See, e.g., In re O'Neill, Securities Act Release No. 5938 (Aug. 3, 1978) (rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney who assisted client in concealing political payments to foreign
governments); in re Feld, 46 S.E.C. 103, 103-04 (1975) (rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney
who prepared misleading offering circular); In re Keltner, Securities Act Release No. 4738
(Nov. 30, 1964), reprinted in [1964-66 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,191 at
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torney unfitness15 and primarily disciplined attorneys who, by committing subversive or perjurious actions, disrupted the Commission's administrative proceedings.16 If the SEC determined that an attorney did
not possess the requisite professional qualifications to represent others, 7
was lacking in elements of character or integrity,18 or was guilty of
unethical or improper conduct, 9 the attorney was subject to rule 2(e)
disciplinary action.' In 1970, however, the SEC promulgate4 an amend-

82,266-67 (rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney who filed misleading statement with SEC);
In re Fleischman, 37 S.E.C. 832, 833 (1950) (rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney who prepared
and filed materially misleading documents with SEC); see also Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774, 786-88 (1979) (expansion of rule 2(e)
liability); Marsh, supra note 9, at 988-89 (same).
1 See 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e)(1)(i-ii) (1982) (original bases of rule 2(e) attorney liability);
see also infra text accompanying notes 17-20 (same).
1 See, e.g., In re Dewitt, 38 S.E.C. 879, 879-80 (1959) (SEC permanently suspended SEC
practice privilege of attorney who intentionally concealed information relevant to SEC investigation); In re Dougherty 38 S.E.C. 82, 82-83 (1957) (SEC permanently suspended SEC
practice privilege of attorney who gave false testimony in SEC investigation); In re
Fleischman, 37 S.E.C. 832, 832-33 (1950) (SEC suspended SEC practice privilege for two
years of attorney who prepared and filed materially misleading documents); see also Marsh,
supra note 9, at 990 (rule 2(e) proceedings prior to 1970). Rule 2(e) disciplinary action entails
either temporary or permanent suspension of a practitioner attorney's privilege to practice
before the Commission. See 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e)(1) (1982) (SEC rule 2(e) sanctions).
17 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(i) (1982; 1 FED. REG. 1753 (1936); see also Barber, Lawyer
Duties in SecuritiesTransactions Under Rule 2(e): The Carter Opinions,1982 B.Y.U. L. REV.
513, 520-21 (1982) (original bases of practitioner liability); Dolin, supra note 7, at 334-35 (same).
When the Commission required that all attorney practitioners be members of the SEC bar,
rule 2(e) provided a means by which the Commission could refuse an attorney admission
to the SEC bar and thus effectively deny the attorney the privilege of engaging in SEC
practice. See In re Van Dorn, 3 S.E.C. 267, 269 (1938) (SEC can deny audience to professionals who do not meet professional standards); 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e(1)(i) (1982) (practitioner
attorneys must possess certain qualifications to represent others); see also Dolin, supranote
7, at 334-35. Today, membership in a state bar association constitutes conclusive evidence
that an attorney possesses the requisite professional qualifications. See 5 U.S.C. 5 500(b)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (attorney duly admitted to state bar association may practice before
administrative agencies).
" See 17 C.F.R. 5 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1982); 1 FED. REG. 1753 (1936); see also Barber, supra note
17, at 520-21 (listing character and integrity as prerequisites for SEC practice); Dolin, supra,
note 7, at 334 (same).
19See 17 C.F.R. 5 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1982); 1 FED. REG. 1753 (1936); see, e.g., In re FeId, 46
S.E.C. 103, 103-04 (1975) (circulation of misleading offering circular constitutes improper
professional conduct that violates rule 2(e)); In re Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347, 371 (1960) (gross
indifference to observation of laws constitutes unethical and improper professional conduct); In re Dougherty, 38 S.E.C. 82, 85-86 (1957) (giving false testimony to SEC during
investigation constituted improper professional conduct); see also Barber, supra note 17,
at 520-21 (improper or unethical conduct is basis for rule 2(e) disciplinary action); Dolin,
supra note 7, at 334 (same); cf. Marsh, supra note 9, at 990-93 (application of improper or
unethical conduct standard to rule 2(e) proceedings).
I See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1982). The SEC may deny attorney practitioners the
privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission temporarily or permanently.
Id.; see also Marsh, supra note 9, at 993-1003 (administrative procedures involved in rule
2(e) proceedings).
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ment to rule 2(e),' subjecting attorneys to disciplinary action whenever
a court of competent jurisdiction' or the SEC in an administrative
proceeding determined that the attorney had willfully violated or aided
and abetted the violation of any provision of the federal securities laws.'
The 1970 amendment to rule 2(e) ushered in a new era of SEC administrative disciplinary action.25 In essence, the SEC application of the
amended rule 2(e) imposed upon practitioner attorneys a fiduciary duty
to protect the interests of the securities trading public and safeguard the
integrity of the securities markets by ensuring that clients obey federal
securities laws.28 The 1970 amendment to rule 2(e), however, conflicts with
2 See 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e}(iii) (1982) (allowing rule 2(e) disciplinary sanction for willful
violations or for willfully aiding and abetting violations of federal securities law).
I See Securities Exchange Act of 1933, S 22, 15 U.S.C. S 77v (1976) (United States
district courts have jurisdiction over offenses and violations of 1933 Securities Exchange
Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 27, 15 U.S.C. S 78aa (1976) (United States district
courts have jurisdiction over offenses and violations of 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-559 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (general federal administrative proceeding procedures); 15 U.S.C. SS 78w(cY-78aa (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (SEC administrative
proceeding procedures); 17 C.F.R. SS201.16-.28 (1982) (SEC Rules of Practice relating to
administrative hearing procedures). An SEC administrative proceeding can take place as
either an informal hearing or a formal trial before an administrative law judge. See 15 U.S.C.
S 78v-2 (1976). Following the original proceeding, a party may appeal to the full Commission. See id. S 78y. See generally Marsh, supra note 9, at 993-1003 (explanation of SEC administrative procedures with regard to rule 2(e)).
4 See Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24, 1970) reprintedin [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,913, at 80,032 (amending rule 2(e) by adding rule 2(e{Xliii);
see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(iil) (1982) (rule 2(e)(i)(iii)). see generallyKarmel, Attorney's Securities
Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw 1153 (1972) (1970 amendment to rule 2(e) analyzed).
I See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant PoliceForce:A New Role ForLawyers, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 437,437-41,468-72 (1974) (following promulgation of 1970 amendment torule 2(e), SEC
began disciplining attorney practitioners for failure to ensure that clients disclose required
information); Marsh, supra note 9, at 991-92. In the 1970's, the SEC began asserting the
authority to discipline any attorney who disregarded the affirmative duty to assist the
Commission in ascertaining proper disclosure. Id.; see SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
457 F. Supp. 682, 699-701 (D.D.C. 1978) (SEC disciplined attorney for failure to report client's
true financial status to SEC when client refused to do so); In re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 263
(1973) (SEC instituted rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney for violating duty to protect
integrity of market processes). See generally Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities
of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities
of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1974) (increase in rule 2(e) enforcement and liability after
1970); Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the SecuritiesLawyer, [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631 at 83,386 (1974) (same).
' See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 683, 713-14 (D.D.C. 1978)
(securities lawyers' duty to ensure that clients obey securities laws); In re Keating, Muething
& Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,989 (SEC suspended privilege of law
firm to practice before Commission for not discovering client's failure to disclose required
information); In re Feld, 46 S.E.C. 103, 103-04, 108 (1975) (SEC disciplined attorney for failing to prevent violation of securities laws by client); In re Ferguson, Securities Act Release
No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974) (SEC disciplined attorney for failing to detect and prevent client
nondisclosure). See generally Goldberg, Ethical Dilemma: Attorney-Client Privilege vs. the
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the time-honored adversary ethic embodied in legal representation by requiring attorneys to police client conduct.Y
The 1970 amendment to rule 2(e) and the SEC's subsequent determination that attorney pratitioners must take affirmative steps toward
ensuring client compliance with securities laws' generated concern in the
legal community for two reasons. First, in finding an affirmative duty to
dissuade clients from violating federal securities laws,' the SEC implied
that attorney practitioners must serve as enforcement agents for the Commission and not merely as zealous advocates for client concerns." Second,
the SEC's imposition of a stricter standard regarding attorney responsibility for client conduct resulted in a dramatic increase in the number
of rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings against attorneys.31 The SEC's agNational Student Marketing Doctrine,1 SEC. REG. L.J. 297 (1974); Lowenfels, supra note 25;
Shipman, The Need For SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys
Under the FederalSecurities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973).
See Myers, The Attorney-Client Relationshipand the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility:
Suggested Attorney LiabilityFor Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraudto the Securities andExchange Commission, 44 FORDHAML. REV. 1113,113844 (1976) (rule 2(e) forces securities lawyers
to consider factors other than sole interests of clients); Note, A Securities Lawyer's Dilemma: The SEC's Policy of Disclosure v. the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
797, 803-10 (1978) (SEC rule 2(e) disclosure requirements weaken attorney-client privilege).
I See supra text accompanying notes 21-26 (shift in SEC enforcement philosophy after
1970).
1 See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713-14 (D.D.C. 1978)
(securities lawyers have affirmative duty to investing public to ensure that clients make
proper financial disclosure). See generally Goldberg, supranote 26 at 297-99; Shipman, supra
note 26 at 231-38; Note, supra note 27, at 803-10.
1 See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 93,360, at 91,913 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972) (securities lawyers' duty to public]. But
see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4 (1971) (lawyer should preserve the
confidences and secrets of client). The American Bar Association (ABA) and the SEC have
differed over the appropriateness of the affirmative duty to disclose enunciated in National
Student Marketing. See Address by SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommers, Jr., The Commission and the Bar:Forty Good Years, Annual Luncheon of ABA Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law, Honolulu, Hawaii (Aug. 14, 1974), reprinted in Mathews, Liabilities of
Lawyers Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 105,119 (1975). The ABA has criticized the SEC's National Student Marketing affirmative duty to disclose standard because
the standard requires an attorney who discovers a client's illegality to disclose the discovered
information in instances when the ABA's ethical standard would not require disclosure.
Compare ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY, DR 7402(B)(1) (1971) (disclosure optional)
with SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713-14 (D.D.C. 1978). See generally
Kidston, CurrentDevelopments in Attorney-Client Privilege,36 Bus. LAW. 701 (1981); Myers,
supra note 27, at 1138-44.
", See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982
(July 2, 1979), reprintedin [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,990
(concurring opinion of SEC Chairman Williams). From 1935 to 1979, the SEC instituted
100 rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys. Id. From 1970 to 1979, the SEC instituted 85
rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys. Id. at 81,994 (dissenting opinion of SEC Commissioner Karmel). According to Chairman Williams and Commissioner Karmel, 85% of all
rule 2(e) proceedings brought against attorneys occured after the SEC promulgated the
1970 amendment to rule 2(e). See Marsh, supra note 9, at 988-89. Another investigation,
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gressive stance on rule 2(e) liability motivated attorney practitioners to
challenge the propriety of rule 2(e) as a disciplinary instrument.'
Securities lawyers questioned whether rule 2(e) possessed an underlying
statutory basis,3 whether the Commission had overstepped its congressional mandate in promulgating disciplinary rules,- and whether the Commission had the authority to define minimum standards of professional
conduct. 5 In three separate cases after 1970, SEC practitioners attacked
the statutory validity of rule 2(e) and the authority of the SEC to promulgate disciplinary rules. 6 In each case, the Commission successfully
defended SEC power to suspend or disbar attorneys from securities
practice? In the most recent case, 8 the Commission formally enunciated
which, unlike Chairman Williams' and Commissioner Karmel's survey, did not have access
to nondisclosable SEC records, showed that the SEC brought 63 rule 2(e) proceedings against
attorneys during the 1970-79 period. Marsh, supra note 9, at 988-89. The investigation shows
that 630/0 of all rule 2(e) proceedings brought against attorneys occurred after the SEC
promulgated the 1970 amendment to rule 2(e). Id.
11 See Block and Ferris, SEC Rule 2(e)-A New StandardFor Ethical Conduct Or An
Unauthorized Web of Ambiguity?, 11 CAP. U. L. Rav. 501,508-12, 516-24 (1982); see also infra
text accompanying notes 32-34 (listing three major challenges securities lawyers have lodged
against rule 2(e)).
I' See, e.g., SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7,10-11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (attorney practitioners questioned rule 2(e)'s statutory basis); Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (attorney
practitioner claimed rule 2(e) is ultra vires administrative promulgation); Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701, 702-03 (D.D.C. 1957) (attorney practitioner attacked SEC's authority
to promulgate rule 2(e)), affd on other grounds, 251 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 927 (1958).
1 See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982
(July 2, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,988-89
(attorney practitioner claimed rule 2(e) not necessary and appropriate to achieve proper
SEC objectives); 15 U.S.C. SS 78b-d, 78w(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (congressional mandate
for SEC to promulgate necessary and appropriate rules).
See In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,184
(Mar. 7, 1979) (attorneys contest authority of SEC to determine ethical standards for legal
profession), af'd, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981),
reprintedin [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,169-70 (attorneys
contest SEC minimum conduct standard for attorney practitioners).
I See Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,415 to 93,498-99 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1978), arid, 609 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1979); In re
Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982 (July 2, 1979),
reprintedin [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,988-89; Carter, [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,184 (Mar. 7,1979), rev'd on othergrounds,
Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprintedin [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,169-70.
1 See Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding validity of rule 2(e)); In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
15982 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124
at 81,988-89 (full Commission upheld validity of rule 2(e)); In re Carter, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprintedin [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,169-70 (full Commission upheld validity of rule 2(e) and
SEC minimum conduct standard for practitioner attorneys).
' In re Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,184 (Mar.
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a minimum standard of conduct for practitioner attorneys, that represents
the SEC's furthest and most current extension of rule 2(e) liability. 0
In the first of the three cases, Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC,1 a large
international accounting firm challenged the SEC's authority to regulate
the right of professional practitioners to appear before the Commission.' 2
Touche, Ross & Co. (Touche Ross) sought declaratory relief' in the district
court for the Southern District of New York and asked that the district
court enjoin the SEC from conducting rule 2(e) proceedings. 4 The SEC
had instituted rule 2(e) proceedings against Touche Ross one month prior
to Touche Ross' commencement of the action for declaratory and injunctive relief, 45 but the SEC did not pursue the rule 2(e) proceeding until
after both the district court and the Second Circuit, on appeal, had heard
Touche Ross' arguments against rule 2(e).4' Before the district court,
7, 1979), rev'd on other grounds, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597
(Feb. 28, 1981), reprinted in [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at
84,169-70.
See In re Carter, Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprintedin [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 to 84,172. The SEC's minimum standard
of conduct, enunciated in Carter,provides that when a lawyer, who has significant responsibilities in effectuating a client company's compliance with federal disclosure requirements,
becomes aware that the client is not complying with disclosure requirements, the lawyer
must take affirmative action to remedy the nondisclosure problems or face rule 2(e)
disciplinary action. See id.
' See Remarks of Edward F. Greene, General Counsel of the SEC, to the New York
Lawyers' Association, SEC Disciplinary ProceedingsAgainst Lawyers Reviewed, January
13, 1982, reprintedin 187 N.Y.L.J. 15 at 1, col. 2 (Jan. 22, 1982) (the SEC's Carterconduct
standard is still in force); transcript of interview with John S. R. Shad, Chairman of SEC,
Shad Delineates His Goals As Commissioner ChairmanTo StreamlineSEC Rules, December
14, 1981, reprintedin 186 N.Y.L.J. 113 at 51, col. 1 (Dec. 14, 1981) (SEC will apply Carter
standard in determining rule 2(e) liability of attorney practitioners); see also Dolin, supra
note 7, at 345-46 (implications of Carter standard upon securities practice).
" Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415
at 93,497 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
42 See Touche Ross, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,498-99
(Touche, Ross challenged rule 2(e) at trial); Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 573 (Touche Ross challenged rule 2(e) on appeal).
See Touche Ross, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,498.
Touche Ross sought to have the district court declare rule 2 (e) an invalid administrative
promulgation. Id.
" See Touche Ross, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,498.
Touche Ross sought injunctive relief and argued that irreparable harm would result if the
district court allowed the SEC to decide the legal question pertaining to rule 2(e)'s validity. Id.
"See Touche, Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.L. REP. (CCH) 80,720
at 86,862 (Sept. 2, 1976) (SEC instituted rule 2(e) proceedings against Touche Ross).
46 See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 582 (Second Circuit allowed SEC to pursue rule 2(e)
proceedings against Touche Ross following Touche Ross' unsuccessful appeal). The SEC
formally instituted rule 2(e) proceedings against Touche Ross after holding an investigatory
hearing to determine if grounds existed to cite the firm for a rule 2(e) violation. See in
re Touche, Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,720, at 86,862
(Sept. 2, 1976); see also 15 U.S.C. S 78u(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (power of SEC to hold

1292

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1285

Touche Ross argued that rule 2(e) was invalid both because the SEC lacked
statutory authority to hold disciplinary proceedings and because the proceedings were inherently biased and violative of the practitioners' due
process rights." The accounting firm also alleged that the SEC, as an
administrative body, could not adjudicate the strictly legal questions concerning the Commission's statutory authority to promulgate rule 2(e)48 and
claimed that Touche Ross faced irreparable harm if the district court
allowed the SEC to determine the strictly legal questions
administratively.49 The district court ruled that Touche Ross did not
establish that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating
rule 2(e)"0 and did not prove that the rule 2(e) proceedings were either
biased or violative of the firm's due process rights." Furthermore, the
district court held that, since Touche Ross had not shown that the SEC
clearly had violated its statutory authority,52 the SEC properly brought

the investigatory hearing). Following the institution of rule 2(e) proceedings, the SEC would
have brought the case before an administrative law judge for trial de novo. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 554-559 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Administrative Procedure Act provisions for trial de
novo); 15 U.S.C. S 78v (1976) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provision for trial de novo).
Touche Ross, however, appealed directly to federal court rather than appearing before an
administrative law judge. See Touche Ross [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
96,415, at 93,502 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1978) (Touche Ross trial). Following a trial before an
administrative law judge, a rule 2(e) defendant may appeal the administrative law judge's
decision to the full Commission. See 15 U.S.C. S 78d-l(b) (1976) (right to appeal to full Commission), 17 C.F.R. § 201.17 (1982) (alpellate procedure). A rule 2(e) defendant may obtain
review of the full Commission's decision in federal district court. See 15 U.S.C. S 78y(a)
(1976) (review by federal court).
" Touche Ross, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,498-99.
Touche Ross argued that the SEC showed bias by opening the proceeding against Touche
Ross to the public. Id. at 93,498. Rule 2(e) authorizes the SEC to open any rule 2(e) proceeding to the public. 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e)(7) (1982). See [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,498. Touche Ross argued that the rule 2(e) administrative proceeding violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment because rule 2(e) was invalid and therefore could not rightfully serve as the basis for an administrative proceeding.
Id; see also U.S. CONST., amend. V (constitutional due process requirement). Touche Ross contended that rule 2(e) was invalid because the SEC possessed no authority to discipline professional practitioners. See [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,498.
Touche Ross, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,499 (Touche
Ross' objections to SEC's attempts to adjudicate strictly legal issue).
49 Id.
at 93,499-500. (Touche Ross claim that irreparable harm would ensue if district
court forced exhaustion of administrative remedies). Touche Ross argued that an administrative law judge lacks the jurisdiction and ability to decide questions involving the
validity of SEC administrative rules and procedures. Id at 93,499. Touche Ross contended,
therefore, that the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies would force Touche
Ross to submit to the authority of a court acting without jurisdiction. Id. at 93,499-500.
1 Id. at 93,500-02. The district court held that the SEC had implicit authority, pursuant to the Commission's general rulemaking power, to promulgate rule 2(e). Id. at 93,500.
Id. at 93,499-502.
'" Id.
at 93,500; see 15 U.S.C. 5 78w(a)(1) (1976) (administrative agency's rulemaking
power to promulgate necessary and proper administrative rules).
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the rule 2(e) proceeding against Touche Ross' and Touche Ross must exhaust all administrative remedies before obtaining judicial review of the
SEC's rule 2(e) decision."
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Touche Ross again attacked the validity of rule 2(e), and argued that the SEC had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating rule 2(e).5 The Second Circuit first held that Touche
Ross did not need to exhaust all possible administrative remedies before
obtaining judicial review of the SEC's statutory authorization to promulgate rule 2(e).56 The Second Circuit then considered the statutory basis
of rule 2(e) and determined that the SEC lacked express statutory author5
ity to regulate and discipline professional practitioners. 1 Nevertheless,
9
the Second Circuit upheld the validity of rule 2(e) on several theories.
The Touche Ross court found that the Commission possessed inherent
authority to protect the integrity of SEC administrative processes" and
6
implied authority to prescribe rules necessary and appropriate to ex2
ecute SEC policies. In addition, the Touche Ross court determined that
rule 2(e) was valid, despite the absence of SEC express authorization to
discipline attorney practitioners, because rule 2(e) disciplinary power constituted a legitimate, reasonable and direct adjunct to the Commission's
' See Touche Ross, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,415 at 93,503
(district court's finding that rule 2(e) proceeding against Touche, Ross was not improper).
See id. at 93,502-03 (rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies precedent
to judicial review does not cause irreparable injury), rev'd, Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC,
609 F.2d 570, 574-77 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S.
41, 51 (1938) (litigant must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review);
United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 167 (1904) (same). But see McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (exhaustion of administrative remedies rule is subject to numerous
exceptions); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-89 (1958) (exhaustion of administrative
remedies rule does not apply when litigant contests jurisdiction of agency to hold administrative proceeding). See generally Berger, Exhaustion of AdministrativeRemedies, 48
YALE L.J. 981 (1939).

Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 573 (2d Cir. 1979).
See id. at 574-77. The Second Circuit determined that the issue in Touche Ross involved only the validity of rule 2(e) and was purely a question of statutory interpretation.
Id. at 577. Since Touche Ross involved only a question of statutory interpretation, the Second Circuit held that the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply.
Id; see also supra note 54 (exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement).
1, See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 577-82 (Second Circuit considered whether rule 2(e)
was valid).
See id. at 570 (rule 2(e) has no express statutory basis).
See infra text accompanying notes 60-64 (Second Circuit's theories validating rule 2(e)).
See id. at 581. The Second Circuit determined that if incompetent or unethical practitioners were allowed to file and certify clients' financial statements, the reliability of the
SEC's disclosure process would be impaired. Id; see also infra text accompanying notes
123-46 (SEC's inherent power to make rules).
" See 15 U.S.C. §78w(a}l) (1976) (SEC's power to promulgate necessary and appropriate
rules); see also infra text accompanying notes 147-73 (SEC's implicit power to make rules).
' 609 F.2d at 577-78 (SEC had implied authority to promulgate rule 2(e)).
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explicit statutory power." Finally, the Second Circuit found support for
rule 2(e)'s validity in the fact that every court which had adjudicated a
rule 2(e) case had upheld rule 2(e)'s validity. 4 Although Touche Ross pertained to accountant liability under rule 2(e), the Second Circuit, in strong
valid against accountants, rule 2(e)
dicta, declared that if rule 2(e) was
6 5
was also valid against attorneys.
Two months after the Second Circuit decided Touche Ross, the SEC
6
brought rule 2(e) proceedings
in In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp"
against a law firm and relied upon Touche Ross to support the validity
of rule 2(e).61 In an administrative hearing before the full Commssion, 8
the SEC found that the law firm of Keating, Muething & Klekamp had
not taken adequate measures to ensure that staff attorneys filed accurate
disclosure documents for firm clients with the SEC.69 The SEC then found
that the firm negligently conducted its securities practice, and that the
firm's negligence constituted improper professional conduct under rule
2(e).10 In light of the findings, the SEC instituted disciplinary proceedings
against the firm."' In a concurring opinion, SEC Chairman Williams claimed
that the Second Circuit's Touche Ross explanation of rule 2(e)'s validity
provided a rationale for disciplining either accountants or attorneys.7
Chairman Williams also noted, as an additional basis for maintaining rule
2(e) sanctions, the SEC's inability to assure that all securities traders abide
61Id. at 579-80 (SEC had adjunctive authority to promulgate rule 2(e)); see also infra
text accompanying notes 174-82 (SEC's adjunctive power to make rules).
609 F2d at 578.
See id. at 580-81 (rule 2(e) applies to both accountants and attorneys).
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982 (July 2, 1979), reprintedin [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,124 at 81,981.
" See id. at 81,990 (Williams, Chairman, concurring).
" See id. at 81,989; see also 15 U.S.C. S 78d-l(a)(b) (1976) (right of rule 2(e) defendant
to seek review before full Commission).
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,988-89.
,o Id. The SEC found that the firm of Keating, Muething & Klekamp was involved
so directly in its client's disclosure operations that the firm must have known about the
client's failure to disclose material information. Id, The Commission held that the firm engaged
in improper and unethical conduct by neglecting to take action to ensure that the client
did disclose the required information after discovering the extent of the client's nondisclosure.
Id. at 81,989. The Commission also held that the firm's silence after discovering the client's
illegalities made the firm an aider and abettor to the illegality. Id.; see SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 534, 541-42 (1973) (attorney was aider and abettor to client illegality premised
on attorney negligence). See generally Slain, supra note 24 (lack of attorney diligence may
serve as basis for rule 2(e) liability); Note, "Due Diligence" and the Expert in Corporate
Securities Registrations, 42 S. CAL L. REv. 293, 301-08 (1969) (same).
" [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,989. Although the Commission formally instituted rule 2(e) proceedings against Keating, Muething & Klekamp,
the Commission accepted the firm's offer of settlement upon the firm's promise to adopt
internal, self-regulatory practices to ensure that the firm makes proper disclosures in the
future. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. S 201.8 (1982) (settlement procedure).
See [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,990 (Williams, Chairman, concurring).
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by all federal securities laws. 7 Chairman Williams argued that the SEC
requires the conscripted aid of practitioner attorneys to prevent securities
7
law violations.
SEC Commissioner Karmel, dissenting, argued against the validity
of rule 2(e) as a device for disciplining attorneys 5 and distinguished Touche
Ross by suggesting that the SEC should hold accountants to a different
standard of liability than attorneys.78 The dissent contended that the SEC
had absolutely no congressional authority to discipline attorneys under
rule 2(e)77 but believed that, because Congress had given the SEC express

statutory authority to regulate accounting standards, the Touche Ross court
was correct in finding that the SEC had implied authority to discipline
accountants under rule 2(e). 78 The dissent also argued that the disciplining of an attorney by an administrative agency necessarily infringed upon

the authority of federal and state courts to regulate the conduct of the
bar.79 The dissent noted that judicial authority to discipline attorneys considerably weakened the SEC's claim that rule 2(e) disciplinary power over
attorneys was a necessary and appropriate instrument for effectuating
SEC policies. 0 The dissent contended that the SEC did not require the
conscripted aid of practitioner attorneys to maintain an effective level

" See id. at 81,991.
" See id. The Commission first articulated the view that attorneys should aid the SEC
in uncovering securities laws violations in In re Fields. See In re Fields, Securities Act
Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), reprintedin [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,407 at 83,172. See generally Lipman, supra note 25, at 440-42 (SEC premises rule 2(e)
liability upon attorney failure to police clients).
71 [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,992 (Karmel, Comm'r,
dissenting).
"' Id. at 81,993. The Keating dissent argued that Congress had, by statutory authorization, given the SEC statutory authority to regulate the accounting profession but had granted
no authority to regulate the legal profession. Id. at 81,992; see 15 U.S.C. S 77s(a), 77aa
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (SEC's statutory authority to regulate accounting profession). Furthermore, the dissent contended that administrative regulation of the practitioner attorney
bar would harm the legal profession by weakening the adversary ethic. [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,996.
1 See id. at 81,993-95. The Keating dissent argued that courts, not federal agencies,
have plenary jurisdiction to discipline the legal profession. Id.; see also Kivitz v. SEC, 475
F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (SEC lacks express authority to regulate attorneys).
" See [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,993 (Karmel, Comm'r,
dissenting). The Keating dissent contended that language contained in the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, granting the SEC power to define accounting standards implied the SEC
authority to regulate the accounting profession. Id.; see 15 US.C. §5 77s(a), 77aa (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) (Schedule A) (SEC authority to regulate accounting standards). See generally
Comment, Regulation of the Accounting Profession Through Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of
Practice:Valid or InvalidExercise of Power?, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1159,1172-79 (1980)(SEC's
rule 2(e) authority to regulate accountants).
See [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEa L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,996 Karmel, Comm'r,
dissenting).
See id. at 81,992 (Congress gave the SEC power to promulgate necessary and proper rules); id. at 81,996 (regulation of attorneys is not necessary and appropriate).
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of enforcement 8' and argued that any rule which required attorneys to
function as SEC enforcement agents would undermine the adversary
system of legal representation. 2 Finally, the dissent suggested that if the
SEC used rule 2(e) against attorney practitioners at all, the SEC should
discipline only those attorneys who act unethically or improperly while
personally representing' clients before the Commission.'
In 1981, a well-publicized attack on the validity of rule 2(e) appeared
in the In re Carter opinions.' In in re Carter, the SEC instituted rule
2(e) proceedings against two attorneys86 and charged that the attorneys
had willfully aided and abetted violations of the 1934 Securities Act (Carter
trial).8" Following a finding of guilty and imposition of a sanction ' by an
administrative law judge, the two attorneys appealed the Cartertrial ruling to the full Commission (Carterappeal).' At the Carter trial, the SEC
alleged that the two attorneys, representing a corporate client, willfully
aided and abetted the violation of securities disclosure requirements by
failing to ensure that the corporation's management made proper
disclosures as required by the securities laws 9 and by failing to report
the management's nondisclosures to the corporation's board of directors.8
The SEC also claimed that the attorneys, by not ensuring that the corporation made proper disclosures, engaged in unethical and improper professional conduct. 2 The two attorneys did not attack the factual allega81 See id. at 81,996.

See id. at 81,992.
See id. at 81,995. The dissent contended that attorneys who do not appear on behalf
of clients before the Commission should be immune from rule 2(e) liability. Id. See generally
Dolin, supra note 7, at 347-55 (explaining SEC's broad construction of appear or practice
language in rule 2(e)); supra note 7 (appear or practice language).
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,995 (Karmel, Comm'r,
dissenting).
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,165,82,184 (Mar. 7,1979),
rev'd on other grounds, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb.
28, 1981), reprinted in (1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,145.
' See [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,166. In Carter,the
SEC instituted rule 2(e) proceedings against two attorneys of the New York City law firm
of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Petty. Id.
, See id. at 82,169-69 (SEC charges against two attorney-defendants).
'8 See id. at 82,187. The Commission found both attorneys guilty of rule 2(e) violations
and denied both attorneys the privilege of appearing and practicing before the Commission
for the periods of one year and nine months, respectively. Id.
" See In re Carter, Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprintedin [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) S 82,847 at 84,145; see also 15 U.S.C. S 78d-l(a)(b)
(1976) (statutory right to appeal to the full Commission); 17 C.F.R. S 201.17 (1982) (appellate
procedure).
See [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,168.
" See id. at 82,169.
' See id. at 82,180-84 (SEC charged that two attorneys acted unethically and improperly);
see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1979) (lawyer must exert best
efforts to ensure proper disclosure by client); EC 5-18 (1979) (lawyer must advise client
corporation's board of directors when corporation's management refuses to disclose proper
information).
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tions contained in the SEC's charges against them. 3 Instead, the two attorneys argued that the rule 2(e) standard was unconstitutionally vague94
because the standard failed to define what actions or inactions would constitute unethical or improper professional conduct. 5
In the Cartertrial, the administrative law judge determined that the
defendant attorneys' failure to take either affirmative action to ensure
that the corporation's management made proper disclosure or to communicate management's improper disclosure to the corporation's board
of directors constituted unethical and improper conduct in violation of rule
2(e).99 The administrative law judge rejected the defendant attorneys'
arguments that the rule 2(e) standards were unconstitutionally vague and
determined that the two attorneys could have found the applicable standards by consulting the American Bar Association's Code of Professional
Responsibility 7 and the SEC's pronouncements in prior rule 2(e)
proceedings." The two attorney defendants appealed to the full
Commission.99 On appeal, the two attorney defendants again attacked the
validity of rule 2(e) and claimed that the standard contained in rule 2(e)
was unconstitutionally vague10 but also argued that the 1970 amendment
See [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,180 (attorney defendants chose affirmative defense rather than contesting underlying facts in SEC's complaint
against them).
See id. at 82,184 (attorney's claim that rule 2(e) was invalid); id. at 82,180 (attorney's
claim that rule 2(e) was unconstitutionally vague).
" See id. at 82,180 (claim that rule 2(e) was unconstitutionally vague); see also Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939). A penal or disciplinary statute is unconstitutional
if the statute possesses vague standards that do not provide notice to potential defendants
by advising when disciplinary action is appropriate. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458.
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,186-87 (finding of rule
2(e) violations); see 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1982) (1970 amendment to rule 2(e)); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1979) (attorney for corporate client
must report corporate management's violations of securities laws to corporation's board
of directors if management refused to make proper disclosures).
9 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18, EC 7-8, DR 1-102(A)(4), DR
7-102(A)(7) (1979).
" [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at82,183-84;seeInreKeating,
Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982 (July 2, 1979), reprinted
in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,988-89 (rule 2(e) disciplinary
action against law firm); In re O'Neill, Securities Act Release No. 5938 (Aug. 3, 1978), (rule
2(e) proceeding against attorney who drafted misleading opinion letter); In re Melrose,
Securities Exchange Release no. 14720 (May 1, 1978), reprintedin [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. RtP. (CCH) 81,578 at 80,337 (rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney who assisted
client in violating securities law); In re Feld, 46 S.E.C. 103, 103-04 (1975) (rule 2(e) proceeding
against attorney who prepared misleading circular); In re Fleischman, 37 S.E.C. 832, 833
(1950) (rule 2(e) proceeding against attorney who prepared and filed materially misleading
document with SEC).
" See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,145 (Carterappeal
to full Commission); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78d-l(b) (1976) (right to appeal decision of administrative law judge to full Commission).
"I See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,169; see also supra
note 95 (constitutional vagueness standard).
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to rule 2(e) represented an invalid usurpation of the authority of state
bar associations to discipline attorneys." 1
In the Carter appeal,0 2 the full Commission dismissed the rule 2(e)
proceedings against the attorneys but reiterated that the SEC has authority to discipline attorneys and promulgate standards of conduct for practitioner attorneys." The full Commission held that the standards contained
in rule 2(e) were vague and dismissed the rule 2(e) proceedings against
the attorneys because the SEC had never defined "unethical and improper
conduct."'0 4 The Commission then defined "unethical and improper conduct" by dilineating a minimum standard of conduct for practitioner attorneys representing corporate clients before the SEC. 05 In part, the
See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,147-48.
u See id. at 84,145. The Carter defendants appealed the decision of the administrative

101

law judge to the full Commission. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 5 78d-l(b) (1976) (right to appeal to full
Commission); 17 C.F.R. S 201.17 (1982) (SEC appellate procedure).
"I See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,147-48 (SEC authority to promulgate rule 2(e)); id. at 84,169-71 (SEC authority to promulgate ethical standard
for practitioner attorneys); id. at 84,172 (SEC ethical standard); 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e) (1982)
(SEC rule 2(e)). The Commission contended that the authority to promulgate standards of
conduct for practitioner attorneys stemmed from the SEC's authority to discipline attorneys.
See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,169. Since the defendants
in Carterattacked the rule 2(e) "unethical or improper" conduct standard as being unconstitutionally vague, the Commission in the Carterappeal had an incentive to define what actions
constituted unethical or improper conduct to avoid future constitutional challenges to rule
2(e). See Barber, supra note 17, at 538-40 (unethical or improper definition in Carterappeal);
Dolin, supra note 7, at 347-53. By arguing that the rule 2(e) unethical and improper conduct
standard was unconstitutionally vague and by contending that the SEC had no authority
to define what actions constituted unethical or improper conduct, the Carter defendants
had an argument which if correct, left no rule 2(e) defenses open to the SEC. See [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,147-48 (Carterdefendants' argument).
" See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,173 (dismissal of rule
2(e) proceedings against Carter defendants).
05 See id. at 84,172. The Carter appeal minimum standard of conduct defines unethical
or improper conduct in the context of a corporate attorney's duties upon the discovery
of a client's nondisclosure. Id. The Carter conduct standard provides that:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws becomes
aware that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy
those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates professional
standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance.
Id. The SEC has solicited public comments, which address the appropriateness of the Carter
conduct standard. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 18106, reprinted in [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,026 at 84,531 (Sept. 21,1981). The SEC, in Carter,
also explained what procedures an attorney should follow if the management of a corporate
client refuses to comply with securities laws. See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,847 at 84,172. The SEC suggested that an attorney first should advise the corporation's board of directors about the management's nondisclosure and then seek the help
of other corporate officers if the board of directors refuses to disclose the required information. Id. The Commission advised that, as a final resort, the attorney may resign or disclose
the violation to the SEC if all other attempts at securing disclosure fail. Id. See generally,
Barber, supra note 17, at 539-40 (practitioner attorney options under Carter standard).
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Carter appeal minimum standard of conduct requires that corporate attorneys, who have significant responsibilities in complying with SEC
disclosure requirements, must take prompt, affirmative action"6 to ensure
proper disclosure immediately upon discovering that a corporate client
is not disclosing required information.1"
In spite of the attacks upon rule 2(e)'s validity in Touche Ross,"'0
Keating,"9 and Carter,1 ° rule 2(e) remains an influential and powerful instrument of attorney discipline."' The debate concerning rule 2(e)'s
statutory basis, however, continues. Many of the SEC's arguments in
support of rule 2(e)'s validity are inherently suspect 13 and no doubt will

" See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,172 (requirement
of prompt, affirmative action upon discovery of client's nondisclosure or misconduct). The
SEC did not define precisely what prompt, affirmative action entailed but issued some
guidelines on what courses of action were available to practitioner attorneys who discover
client misconduct. See id. (SEC guidelines on available courses of action); see also supra
note 105 (explanation of available courses of conduct).
See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,172 (Carterstandard).
'o' See [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,415 at 93,497 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
24, 1978), afj'd, 609 F.2d 570, 573 (2d Cir. 1979); see also supra text accompanying notes
41-49, 55 (attacks by Touche Ross on rule 2(e)).
I" See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15982 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,124 at 81,981; see also supratext accompanying
notes 75-84 (Keating dissent's attacks on rule 2(e)).
"I See [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at 82,165, 82,184 (Mar.
7, 1979), rev'd on other grounds, Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprinted
in [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,145; see also supra text accompanying notes 93-95, 100-01 (Carterattacks on rule 2(e)).
"' See Matthews & Thompson, The Commission's Enforcement Program The Uncertainty Is Over & All Is Well, 188 N.Y.L.J. 112 at 29, col. 1-2 (Dec. 13, 1982) (rule 2(e) still
in force despite SEC enforcement slowdown); Remarks of Edward F. Greene, General Counsel
of the SEC, to the New York Lawyer's Association, SEC DisciplinaryProceedingsAgainst
Lawyers Reviewed (Jan. 13, 1982), reprintedin 187 N.Y.L.J. 15 at 4, col. 1-2 (Jan. 22, 1982)
(Carterconduct standard still in force regardless of practitioner attorney and ABA protests); Transcript of interview with John S. R. Shad, Chairman of SEC, Shad Delineates
His Goals as Commission Chairman to Streamline SEC Rules (Dec. 14, 1981), reprintedin
186 N.Y.L.J. 113 at 51, col. 1 (Dec. 14,1981) (SEC will apply Carterappeal standard in determining rule 2(e) liability for attorney practitioners).
1' See Statement by Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, adopted by
ABA Board of Governors on November 30, 1981, ABA Statement on SECAttorney Conduct
Proposal,4 Legal Times of Washington 27 at 24, col. 2 (Dec. 7, 1981) (hereinafter cited as
ABA Statement). The ABA responded to the SEC's call for comments on the Carterconduct
standard by vehemently arguing against the Carterstandard. Id. Although the ABA argued
that the Carterstandard was unnecessary and invalid, the ABA did not address the question of rule 2(e)'s validity. Id.; see also Ranii, ABA Opposes SecuritiesLawyers' Code, 4 Nat'l
L.J. 13 at 5, col. 4 (Dec. 7, 1981). See generally Block & Ferris, supra note 32, at 518-25
(criticisms of Carterstandard); Dolin, supranote 7, at 362-73 (same); Note, Attorney Discipline
by the SEC: 2(e) or not 2(e)?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1267, 1291-302 (1982).
" See infra text accompanying notes 127-32 & 13746 (inherent authority argument
flawed); infra text accompanying notes 162-72 (implicit authority argument flawed); infra
text accompanying notes 179-82 (adjunctive authority argument flawed); infra text accompanying notes 18-388 (SEC argument that Congress implicitly ratified rule 2(e) flawed).
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receive future judicial scrutiny.'" Additionally, the Commission's minimum
standard of conduct faces strong opposition from the American Bar
Association and from state bar associations."'
Over the course of the past thirty years, the SEC has formulated four
arguments in support of rule 2(e). Three arguments assert a statutory
basis for rule 2(e),"' while the fourth asserts that, even if Congress did
not vest the SEC with authority to promulgate rule 2(e), Congress ratified
the SEC's use of rule 2(e) by purposefully not restraining the SEC's exercise of rule 2(e) power."7 Since rule 2(e) does not have and has never had
an express statutory basis in any federal securities law," 8 the rule's validity
must depend upon either inherent,"' implicit, 12 or adjunctive1 21 statutory
"' See Matthews & Thompson, supranote 111, at 45 n.10. The SEC has never instituted
a rule 2(e) proceeding against an attorney practitioner based upon a violation of the Carter
appeal standard. Id. Furthermore, the SEC has begun a program of deemphasizing practitioner disciplinary actions. Id.; see also SECFacedWith Tight Budget, Is Paring"Peripheral"
DefendantsFrom Complaints, Wall Street J., Oct. 20, 1982, at 6, col. 1-2 (SEC deemphasizes
enforcement); Hudson, SEC Goes Easier On Accountants, Relying More On Self-Regulation,
Wall Street J., Aug. 10, 1982, at 29, col. 3-6 (same). But see Speech by SEC Commissioner
Barbara S. Thomas, reprintedin Enforcement Policy, 5 Legal Times of Washington 19 at
23, col. 1 (Oct. 11, 1982) (suggesting that SEC will not deemphasize enforcement operations).
Since the SEC appears to be deemphasizing disciplinary actions against attorneys, a future
proceeding challenging the Carterstandard may not arise until the SEC again begins aggressive disciplinary enforcement. See Greene, supra note 111, at 4; infra text accompanying notes 207-11 (explaining current SEC enforcement policy).
"I Block & Ferris, supra note 32, at 516-17 (ABA questions validity and propriety of
Carter standard); Ranii, supra note 112, at 5 (same); ABA Statement, supra note 112, at
29 (ABA claims Carter standard impinges upon attorney-client relationship).
,ll See infra text accompanying notes 123-46 (SEC's inherent authority to promulgate
rule 2(e)); infra text accompanying notes 147-73 (SEC's implicit authority to promulgate
rule 2(e)); infra text accompanying notes 174-82 (SEC's adjunctive authority to promulgate
rule 2(e)). See generally Note, SEC DisciplinaryProceedings Against Attorneys Under Rule
2(e), 79 MICH. L. REV. 1270 (1981).
"' See infra text accompanying notes 183-88 (implied congressional ratification of rule
2(e)). See generally Note, supra note 116, at 1288-89.
ill See Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,415 at 93,500 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1978 (SEC admits rule 2(e) has no express statutory
authorization), affd, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
11 See Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 573 (2d Cir. 1979) (SEC claimed inherent power to promulgate rule 2(e)); Marsh, supra note 9, at 1009 (same); infra text accompanying notes 123-46 (SEC's inherent power). An administrative agency's inherent authority is the power to act in ways not specifically authorized by statute but required and proper for maintenance of effective regulatory processes. See Note, supra note 116, at 1279
(inherent authority explained).
no See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 582 (SEC claims implicit power to promulgate rule 2(e));
15 U.S.C. § 77s (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (1933 Securities Act implicit power); id. S 78w (1934
Securities Exchange Act implicit power); id. § 80b-11(a) (1940 Investment Companies and
Advisors Act implicit power); Marsh, supra note 9, at 1007-08 (SEC implicit power claim);
infra text accompanying notes 147-73 (SEC implicit power). An administrative agency's implicit authority is the power to make rules pursuant to a legislative grant of general rulemaking power. See Note, supra note 116, at 1280-81 (implicit authority explained).
"' See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 579 (SEC claims adjunctive power to promulgate rule
2(e)); Marsh, supra note 9, at 1004 (adjunctive authority claim); infra text accompanying
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underpinnings or upon implied congressional ratification. 22'
The Commission claims that it possesses inherent authority to maintain probity in all SEC administrative proceedings."' In Touche Ross, the
Commission contended that rule 2(e) is merely an exercise of the SEC's
inherent authority to preserve the integrity of SEC regulatory processes"'
The Commission also contended that the power to discipline attorneys
allowed the SEC to exclude unqualified and incompetent attorneys from
administrative practice and thus ensure that Commission proceedings remain professional and efficient mechanisms of securities regulation." The
SEC in Touche Ross offered the Second Circuit three cases in support
of the Commission's argument that administrative agencies possess inherent power to regulate attorney practitioners. 2 ' The SEC's three supportive cases, however, all concerned agencies that possess quasi-judicial
powers." Quasi-judicial agencies, unlike truly regulatory agencies, act like
courts in adjudicating personal and property rights." Quasi-judicial agencies, which function like courts, possess the same power to screen and
regulate attorney practitioners that courts exercise to ensure decorum
and responsible conduct during proceedings." The SEC is, however, a
truly regulatory agency and not a quasi-judicial agency because SEC attorney practitioners conduct a majority of their practice outside the Commission's formal administrative hearing room." Thus, the SEC's inherent
notes 174-82 (SEC adjunctive power claim). An administrative agency's adjunctive authority is the power to act in ways not specifically authorized by statute but reasonably related
to express powers granted by the legislature. See Note, supranote 116, at 1281-82 (adjunctive authority explained).
122See Note, supra note 116, at 1288-89 (implied ratification explained); infra text accompanying notes 182-87 (implied congressional ratification of rule 2(e)).
1"2 See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 573 (SEC inherent power claim); supra note 119 (explaining inherent power).
:? See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 581.
,' See id. at 581-82 (SEC arguments in favor of rule 2(e) inherent power).
'22Id. at 581; see Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1926) (Board
of Tax Appeals has inherent power to regulate attorney practitioners); Koden v. United
States, 564 F.2d 228,233 (7th Cir. 1977) (Board of Immigration Appeals has inherent power
to regulate attorney practitioners); Herman v. Dulles, 205 F2d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(International Claims Commission has inherent power to regulate attorney practitioners).
1"2 See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 581 (SEC's three cases supporting inherent power);
see also Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1926) (Board of Tax Appeals is quasi-judicial agency); Koden v. United States, 564 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Board of Immigration Appeals is quasi-judicial agency); Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715,
716 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (International Claims Commission is quasi-judicial agency).
" See Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. at 121. The Supreme Court in
Goldsmith stated that quasi-judicial agencies are executive officers or administrative boards
who adjudicate in administrative proceedings the rights and interests of individuals who
appear before them. Id.; see also Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710
(7th Cir. 1976) (quasi-judicial agency resembles court); Hull v. Celanese Corp, 513 F.2d 568,
571 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).
129 See Touche Ross, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
96,415, at 93,500
(Apr. 24, 1978) (SEC argues that quasi-judicial power to discipline practitioners is necessary).
11 See Barber, supra note 17, at 516-17 (SEC lawyers perform mostly administrative
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power to maintain probity in SEC administrative proceedings is narrow13'
and cannot support rule 2(e), which the SEC claims is a broad-based instrument for regulation of practitioner attorneys." Furthermore, the SEC
already possesses regulatory power to maintain decorum and integrity
in SEC administrative processes by virtue of SEC rule 2(f)."s SEC rule
2(f) provides for appropriate disciplinary actions when attorney practitioners act contemptuously during Commission proceedings." Therefore,
if rule 2(e) is merely an exercise of SEC inherent power to protect Commission "proceedings", rule 2(e) is a redundant regulatory mechanism. 35
The SEC, however, also contends that rule 2(e) exists to protect Commission "processes." '36
In Touche Ross, the SEC contended that rule 2(e) represented an exercise of inherent power to preserve the integrity of SEC regulatory
processes, 7 yet the SEC has never defined what the term "processes"
entails.3 8 One commentator suggests that the SEC has equated the term
"processes" with the term "practice before the Commission" as defined
in SEC rule 2(g).39 If the SEC can, in exercise of rule 2(e) power, regulate
all aspects of attorney practice before the Commission, then rule 2(e)
duties on behalf of clients); Doli n, supra note 7, at 347-51 (legal practice before the SEC
involves making filings for clients, drafting advisory opinions, and pursuit of other in-office
duties); Marsh, supra note 9, at 1004 (SEC is not quasi-judicial administrative agency).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 123-25 (SEC's exercise of inherent power must
relate to agency efforts to maintain integrity in regulatory processes).
13 See In re Carter, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb.
28, 1981), reprintedin [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,149-50
(SEC's explanation of rule 2(e)'s purpose).
'" See 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(f) (1982). SEC rule 2(f) provides in part that contemptuous conduct by a practitioner attorney during the course of an administrative hearing is a basis
for excluding the attorney from participation in the hearing. Id.
"3 See id. (SEC rule 2(f)); see also Marsh, supra note 9, at 1005. If the SEC desires only
to maintain proper decorum during administrative hearings and force observance of professional conduct standards during all proceedings, rule 2(f) provides ample disciplinary
power to allow the SEC to ensure that all proceedings remain orderly and professional.
See 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(f) (1982) (SEC rule 2(f)); supra, note 133 (same). Thus, SEC Rule 2(f)
serves well as a device for sanctioning practitioner attorneys who engage in improper or
unethical conduct during the course of a SEC administrative proceeding. See supra note
133 (rule 2(f)).
135See supra note 134 (SEC rule 2(f) provides ample disciplinary power if Commission
is interested only in maintaining decorum and order in administrative proceedings); see also
17 C.F.R. S 201.2(f) (1982) (SEC rule 2(f)).
1" See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 581 (SEC contends rule 2(e) exists to protect administrative processes).
137See id.In Touche Ross, the SEC argued that rule 2(e) was necessary to ensure that
all SEC regulatory processes remain free from reproach. Id.
11 See Dolin, supra note 7, at 347-55 (SEC has never defined "processes" with regard
to rule 2(e)).
" See id. at 348 n.8 (rule 2(g) "practice before the Commission"); see also 17 C.F.R.
5 201.2(g) (1982) (SEC rule 2(g)). As defined in rule 2(g), "practice before the Commission"
entails the transacting of any business with the Commission and the preparation of any
statement, opinion or other paper for filing with the Commission. Id.
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represents a device whereby the SEC can regulate every aspect of the
securities attorney's professional life."' Congressional legislative history,
however, shows that Congress did not intend to grant the SEC such expansive power."' In 1965, Congress amended the Administrative Procedure
Act (APAY" and specifically prohibited administrative agencies from attempting to restrict any attorney in good standing with a state bar association from practicing before the agency."' Legislative history to the 1965
amendment to the APA shows that Congress purposefully deferred to
the state bar associations on questions of attorney competence to practice law.1" An expansive construction of rule 2(e) power conflicts with con5
gressional deference to the state bar associations." Therefore, Congress
did not intend to grant the146SEC broad inherent authority to protect SEC

administrative processes.

The Commission's second and strongest defense of rule 2(e)'s statutory
47
basis is the claim of implicit authority to discipline attorney practitioners.
The SEC claims that implicit statutory authority to promulgate rule 2(e)
lies in language contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34

"I See Dolin, supra note 7, at 351-55. A broad definition of "processes" will allow the
SEC to regulate aspects of a practitioner attorney's practice that do not involve securities
transactions. Id.; see also Amicus Brief of Sullivan & Cromwell at 14,In re Carter, Securities
and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28,1981), reprintedin [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED.SEc. L. REP. (CCH)82,847 at 84,145 (SEC's rule 2(e) authority should not extend
to lawyer's conduct as advisor or draftsman outside of formal administrative hearing setting). See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 990 (interpretation of rule 2(e)'s scope to
include attorney in-office operations is overly broad and unreasonably burdensome on practitioner attorneys).
"I See Block & Ferris, supra note 32, at 508-12 (rule 2(e) cannot regulate all aspects
of practitioner attorney bar); see also infra text accompanying notes 142-46 (congressional
limitations on rule 2(e) power).
" 5 U.S.C. SS 500-576 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
143 See Act of November 8, 1965, S 1(a), 79 Stat. 1281 (1965) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 5 500(b)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (amendment of Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).
" See H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4170,4170-73 (report of House Committee onthe Judiciary on bill favoring abolition of agency admission requirements for practitioner attorneys); see also Marsh, supra
note 9, at 1006 (congressional intention to strip administrative agencies of power to regulate
admission of attorneys to regulatory practice).
"I See Marsh, supra note 9, at 1006-07 (state bar perogatives); Note, supra note 112,
at 1280 (same); see also 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (section of APA abolishing
administrative agency bars). But see 5 U.S.C. 5 500(d)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (APA neither
authorizes nor limits administrative agency's authority to promulgate disciplinary standards
for practitioners).
1I See Marsh, supranote 9, at 1006-07 (limitations .onrule 2(e) inherent power); supra
notes 142-45 and accompanying text (APA limits rule 2(e) inherent power).
1 See Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1979) (SEC's implicit
authority to promulgate rule 2(e)); In re Carter, Securities and Exchange Commission Release
No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprinted in 11981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847 at 84,147-48 (same); see also supranote 120 (explanation of implicit power). See generally
Barber, supra note 17, at 524-26; Block & Ferris, supra note 32, at 508-12.
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Act).148 Section 23(a)(1) of the '34 Act authorizes the SEC to make rules

and regulations "necessary and appropriate" to the administration of
federal securities laws. 149 The "necessary and appropriate" language in

the '34 Act is similar to grants of general rulemaking authority found
in the enabling statutes of other federal agencies.'m Congress routinely
gives general rulemaking authority to federal agencies so that the agencies can resolve myriad administrative problems without acting in an ultra
vires capacity. 5' The agencies given general rulemaking authority,
however, may not use their unspecified power to undermine statutory
goals or contravene congressional intent." Thus, the legislative history
of the '34 Act is important in determining the validity of rule 2(e).
Legislative history to the '34 Act mentioning or alluding to attorney
practitioner disciplinary procedures is scarce, but one Senate Committee
Report on the '34 Act154 suggests that Congress considered giving the
SEC's regulatory predecessor the authority to regulate attorney practitioners but declined to do so.1" The Senate Committee Report shows that
18 See 15 U.S.C. 5 78w(a)(1) (1976) (Section 23(a)(1) of 1934 Act) (SEC has power to make
rules and regulations necessary and appropriate to implement provisions of 1934 Securities
Exchanges Act).
1 See Touche, Ross, 609 F.2d at 577 (implicit authorization); 15 U.S.C. 5 78w(a)(1) (1976)
(codification of 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
15 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. S 871(b) (1976) (authorizing Attorney General of United States
to promulgate rules necessary and appropriate to allow Drug Enforcement Administration
to enforce federal controlled substances laws); 29 U.S.C. 5 156 (1976) (authorizing National
Labor Relations Board to make rules necessary to carry out provisions contained in National Labor Relations Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 7601(a), 7607(d) (Supp. V 1981) (authorizing Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate rules necessary and appropriate to enforce
federal antipollution laws); 46 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (authorizing Federal
Maritime Commission to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out provisions contained in federal shipping laws); 47 U.S.C. SS 154(i), 303(r) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (authorizing
Federal Communications Commission to promulgate rules necessary to enforce federal communications laws); 49 U.S.C. S 1903(b)(10) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (authorizing National Transportation Safety Board to make rules necessary to carry out provisions contained in federal
transportation safety laws).
151See B. SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW S 57, at 151 (1976). The basic premise underlying all statutes vesting administrative agencies with general rulemaking power is the doctrine of ultra vires. Id. An ultra vires action is an action by an agency that exceeds the
statutory limits set by Congress in the agency's enabling legislation. Id. An ultra vires
action is invalid unless ratified by Congress. Id.; see also CAB v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 367
U.S. 316, 322 (1961) (ultra vires action invalid); Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451, 465 (1952)
(ultra vires action stricken); Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1974) (ultra
vires action declared invalid).
152 See SCHWARTZ, supranote 151, S57, at 151-52 (administrative action that contravenes
congressional intent is ultra vires unless ratified by Congress).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 154-56 (analyzing legislative history to 1934
Securities Exchange Act).
See S. REP. No. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1933), reprintedin 2 J.S. ELLENBERGER
& E.P. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURrIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 248 (1973).
"I See id. Prior to the creation of the SEC, the Federal Trade Commission functioned
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Congress feared that the concentration of attorney practitioner disciplinary
power in the hands of a securities regulatory body would be dangerous
to the legal profession.1 Furthermore, the profusion of other regulatory
and disciplinary provisions in the Securities Acts pertaining to brokers,"7
6
9
securities dealers,'" investment advisors," security exchange members, "
and accountants"' makes the omission of an attorney practitioner
62
Arguably, then, the SEC has
disciplinary provision appear intentional."
no implied congressional authority to discipline attorney practitioners. 6 '
The Commission also claims that rule 2(e) disciplinary power is
necessary and appropriate to the administration of federal securities laws
because the state bar associations and other regulatory authorities do not
provide adequate regulation of member attorneys. ' The SEC argues that
as the regulatory agency in charge of overseeing the securities markets. See Securities
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 2(5), 48 Stat. 74, 75 (1933), reprintedin 1 J.S. ELLENBERGER
& E.P. MAHAR. supranote 154, at 75 (listing Federal Trade Commission as agency responsible for administering original 1933 Securities Act). During hearings on the 1933 Securities
Act and in response to a comment by Senator Couzens of Michigan, an attorney with the
Department of Commerce remarked that a statutory provision authorizing the Federal Trade
Commission to regulate attorney practitioners would be dangerous and would lead to many
abuses in administrative authority. S. REP. No. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1933), reprinted
in 2 J.S. ELLENBERGER & E.P. MAHAR, supra note 154, at 248 (1973).
15 Id.
157 See

15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (SEC authorization to regulate and discipline

securities brokers and dealers).
"1 See id. S 78o-4(b)(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (SEC authorization to regulate and institute disciplinary proceedings against municipal securities dealers).
119 See id. § 80b-3(e)(4) (SEC authorization to discipline investment advisors).
1
See id. § 78s(h) (SEC authorization to suspend or expel member of national security
exchange).
"I See id. 77s (SEC authorization to promulgate standards for accountants); id. S 78c
(defining the persons regulated by the SEC). See generally Comment, supra note 78 at 1159
(rule 2(e) regulation of accountants).
"I2See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974) (when statute expressly enumerates certain persons or things, one may assume
that Congress intended to exclude all other persons or things from statutory operation).
Often, courts rely on the logical principle of expressio unius est exclusio alteriusin determining inclusion or exclusion from statutory operation. See Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 463,
169 S.W.2d 321, 325 (1943) (principle applied); Newblock v. Bowles, 170 Okla. 487, 489, 40
P.2d 1097, 1100 (1935) (same). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius provides that the expression of one thing shows the intent to exclude all others by implications. See Little v. Town
of Conway, 171 S.C. 27, 31, 171 S.E. 447, 448 (1933) (exclusion by implication principle applied).
11 See Note, supra note 112 at 1288-89 (rule 2(e) power to regulate attorneys is excluded by implication}, see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Sullivan & Cromwell at 6, In re Carter,
Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981), reprintedin [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,145 (Congress denied SEC power to
regulate attorneys by implication).
"' See address by former SEC Chairman Williams to section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law, ABA Convention, August 1980, Professionalismand the CorporateBar,
reprintedin 36 Bus. LAw. 159, 162-68 (1980). Former Chairman Williams stated that rule 2(e)
is necessary and appropriate because self-regulation by the state bar associations is lax.
Id. at 164.
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rule 2(e) can serve effectively as an additional disciplinary device and contends that the additional disciplinary power provided by rule 2(e) protects
administrative processes by raising the minimum acceptable level of attorney practitioner competence and ethics to a higher standard."5 The
ABA vehemently disagrees with the SEC's contention that state bar
associations have been lax in disciplining member attorneys.'68 Furthermore, the ABA contends that, even if the state bar associations have been
lax in disciplining member attorneys, the SEC lacks both the ability and
the expertise to regulate and discipline attorney practitioners.'"
The Commission's contention that rule 2(e) is a necessary and appropriate exercise of regulatory authority is questionable in light of the
quasi-adjudicative power that the SEC claims under the 1970 amendment
to rule 2(e).168 The 1970 amendment to rule 2(e) allows the SEC to discipline
attorney practitioners upon a finding that the attorney willfully violated
or willfully aided and abetted a violation of the federal securities laws.'69
The SEC has instituted disciplinary proceedings against attorney practitioners pursuant to the 1970 amendment to rule 2(e) without first bringing action in federal district court to determine if a willful violation or
willful aiding and abetting of a violation of the federal securities laws has
occurred.' 0 The 1970 amendment to rule 2(e) thus allows the SEC to adjudicate securities law violations under the pretext of disciplining attorney
practitioners.' Section 27 of the 1934 Act specifically provides that the
,' See id., reprintedin 36 Bus. LAW. at 164 (rule 2(e) is necessary to raise practitioner
attorney competence to acceptable level); see also Securities Act Rel. No. 5088 (Sept. 24,
1970), reprintedin [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,913 at 80,032 (SEC
contention that laxity of professional self-regulation necessitated promulgation of 1970 amendment to rule 2(e)). See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 973-75, 974 n.14 (problems in
profession self-regulation).
...
See ABA Statement, supra note 112, at 25, col. 1 (ABA disagreement with SEC on
attorney self-regulation proficiency); see also, Note, supra note 112, at 1298-302 (ABA contention that state bar associations adequately police legal profession).
"' See Note, supra note 112, at 1298-302 (state bar associations provide ample professional self-regulation); see also Block and Ferris, supra note 32, at 518 (explaining ABA
response to SEC's professional self-regulatory laxity contention).
"
See 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e)(1)(iii) (1982) (1970 amendment to rule 2(e)). By allowing for
attorney disciplinary action upon a finding of a willful violation or a willful aiding and abetting of a violation of a securities law, the 1970 amendment to rule 2(e) implicitly gives the
SEC the jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine what are "willful" violations. Id.; see also
Best, In Oppositionto Rule 2(e) Proceedings,36 Bus. LAW. 1815,1815-17 (1981) (rule 2(e) vests
the SEC with unauthorized quasi-judicial power); Dolin, supra note 7, at 355-61 (explaining
1970 amendment); infra text accompanying notes 169-71 (same).
See 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e)(1)(iii) (1982) (rule 2(e)).
"o See, e.g., In re Carter, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 35-17597
(Feb. 28, 1981), reprintedin [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,146
(rule 2(e)(1)(iii) prosecution without prior judicial determination of willful violation of securities
laws); In re Hawtrey, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14760 (May 15, 1978).
"' See Best, supra note 168, at 1816-17 (SEC's use of rule 2(e)(1)(iii) power becomes de
facto adjudication of securities laws violations); Note, supra note 112, at 1286-87 (rule 2(e)
undermines jurisdiction of federal district courts to adjudicate securities law violations);
see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 355 (rule 2(e) allows SEC to adjudicate securities law violations).
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federal district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate
securities law violations. 172 Therefore, the 1970 amendment to rule 2(e)
is neither necessary nor appropriate to the administration of federal
securities law. The 1970 amendment is not necessary because the SEC
can prosecute violations of securities law in federal court and is not appropriate because the SEC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate securities law
violations in SEC administrative proceedings.'
The Commission's third and final defense of rule 2(e)'s statutory basis
involves a claim of adjunctive authority to discipline attorney
practitioners.'" Adjunctive authority is the unspecified power to act toward
the fulfillment of an authorized end."1 5 Adjunctive authority does not
possess a basis in necessary and appropriate statutory language and need
not protect the integrity of the SEC's administrative processes to be
valid."8 Instead, adjunctive authority is valid if it is reasonably related
to the achievement of a specified statutory purpose. 7 The Commission
claims that exercise of rule 2(e) disciplinary power is reasonably related
to the realization of the statutory objectives in the '34 Act. 75 The Commission's contention that SEC use of rule 2(e) disciplinary power is a valid
1 See 15 U.S.C. S 78aa (1976) (codification of S 27 of 1934 Act vesting federal district
courts with jurisdiction to hear cases involving violations of security exchange laws).
"I See 15 U.S.C. S 77v (1976) (statute conferring jurisdiction upon federal courts and
state courts to hear actions stemming from violations of 1933 Act); id. S 78aa (statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear actions stemming from violations
of 1934 Act); see also Note, supranote 112, at 1286-87 (SEC should function as complaining
witness and not judge or prosecutor in securities law enforcement action). But see 15 U.S.C.
§ 78w(d) (1976) (SEC can function as prosecutor in seeking an injunction to enjoin activities
that violate securities law).
17,See infra text accompanying note 175-77 (adjunctive authority).
175 See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 579-80 (SEC adjunctive power claim); supra note 121
(explaining adjunctive power); see also Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 655
(1978) (exercise of administrative power is valid if power is legitimate, reasonable, and direct
adjunct to agency's express power); United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry, 426 U.S. 500,
511-15 (1976) (same).
' See Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. at 654-55. The Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) has adjunctive power to establish maximum interim rates without a hearing
even though Congress did not vest the ICC with express statutory authority to establish
interim rates. Id.; see also United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 426 U.S. at 511-513,
515 (ICC has adjunctive power to increase railway rates even though Congress did not
provide the Commission with express power to raise rates).
1" See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356,369 (1973) (administrative
rule is valid if reasonably related to achievement of express statutory purpose); Thorpe
v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969) (administrative regulation is valid if reasonably
related to purposes of enabling legislation).
171See Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 579-80 (SEC adjunctive power claims); see also 15 U.S.C.
S 78b (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (statutory objectives in 1934 Act). The SEC maintained that
rule 2(e) is reasonably related to the realization of congressional objectives set forth in
the 1934 Act because the rule allows the SEC to protect investors directly by excluding
disreputable attorneys from SEC practice. See Amendment to Rule 2(e) of the Rules of Practice, Securities Act Release No. 5088 (Sept. 24, 1970), reprintedin [1970-71 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,913 at 80,032 (purpose of 1970 amendment to rule 2(e)).
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use of adjunctive power, however, is questionable." The Supreme Court
limited the scope of administrative agency adjunctive power in F.C.C. v.
Midwest Video Corporation.8' The Midwest Video court held that an
agency's exercise of adjunctive power does not meet the reasonably related
test, and is therefore invalid, if exercise of the power conflicts with express statutory law."' Since the SEC's exercise of rule 2(e) power conflicts with section 27 of the '34 Act, which vests federal district courts
with exclusive jurisdiction to determine violations of the securities laws,
the SEC's adjunctive power to apply rule 2(e) does not meet the reasonably
related requirement." 2
The Commission's final argument in support of rule 2(e) involves a
claim that Congress has ratified the SEC's construction of the '34 Act
and promulgation of rule 2(e) by not passing legislation denying disciplinary
power to the SEC." The Commission contends that if Congress had desired
to abolish rule 2(e), Congress would have included a provision formally
denying rule 2(e) power to the SEC in one of the three Securities Act
reenactments passed since the SEC promulgated rule 2(e)." Purposeful
and premeditated congressional silence or inaction may serve as evidence
of implied congressional acceptance of the agency's statutory
construction. 8' The SEC contends that because Congress has known of
rule 2(e)'s existence and purpose for over -forty years and has taken no
action to abolish rule 2(e) or limit SEC disciplinary authority during that
period, Congress has deferred to the SEC's statutory construction and

""See infra text accompanying notes 179-82 (fallacies in SEC's use of adjunctive authority
to support validity of rule 2(e)).
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
"'

Id.

at 708.

See 15 U.S.C. S 78aa (1976) (exclusive jurisdiction of federal district courts to hear
cases involving violations of 1934 Act); supra text accompanying notes 168-73 (SEC use
of rule 2(e)(1)(iii) power is quasi-adjudicative). Since the SEC's use of rule 2(e) usurps the
plenary right of federal district courts to adjudicate securities laws violations, rule 2(e)
is not reasonably related to the achievement of an authorized statutory purpose. See in
re Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 708 (1979) (reasonably related requirement).
11 See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1978) (congressional failure to overturn SEC
administrative promulgation during reenactment of SEC rulemaking statutory provisions
is implicit ratification of SEC promulgation).
"' See id.; U.S. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 718-20 (1975) (long standing administrative rule is entitled to substantial deference if Congress has considered rule
in reenactment of rule's enabling legislation); see also Securities Act Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 155 (1975) (reenactment of the 1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C.
SS 78w (1976)); Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 580 (1964)
(same); Act of May 27, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-621, 49 Stat. 1379 (1936) (same).
"n See U.S. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 719 (legislative inaction shows
congressional acceptance of agency construction); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974)
(congressional inaction shows deference to agency's statutory construction); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (same). But see SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. at 119 (agency may not bootstrap
itself into area in which agency has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating statutory mandate).
"
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thus has ratified rule 2(e).186 Implicit ratification of rule 2(e) would have
occurred, however, only if Congress actually had considered the SEC's
statutory construction during subsequent reenactments of the 1934 Act.
Since the Commission has offered no evidence that Congress took the
SEC's statutory construction into account in passing the Securities Act
reenactments, Congress presumably has not ratified rule 2(e) by
implication.' 8
Although the SEC's defenses and explanations of the statutory basis
behind rule 2(e) are not persuasive, no court has determined that rule
2(e) is an invalid administrative promulgation." 9 Furthermore, the current
climate in Congress and the ABA indicates that rule 2(e) has achieved
legitimacy. 9 ' While Congress has not passed a law formally authorizing
administrative agencies to promulgate disciplinary rules, Congress has
considered a bill that would provide administrative agencies statutory
authority to regulate attorney practitioners.' The ABA has offered two
proposals that would increase attorney practitioner liability and make attorney practitioners more amenable to disciplinary action.' First, the
ABA's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline has suggested, in
the Model Rules of Federal Agency Discipline," that Congress vest
188See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. at 118-19 (SEC implicit ratification argument); see also
Note, supra note 116, at 1288-89 (explaining SEC implied ratification argument).
" See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 n.28 (1969) (implied ratification occurs only
if Congress expressly considers and deliberates upon agency's statutory construction and
then purposefully chooses legislative inaction).
18

See SEC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 45-46 (1935);

Note, supra note 116, at 1288 (implied ratification requirements).
"' See Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 579 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding SEC's
authority to promulgate rule 2(e)). No federal court after the Second Circuit decided Touche
Ross has ruled on the SEC's authority to promulgate rule 2(e). See Downing & Miller, supra
note 14, at 776-81.
" See S. REP. No. 1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91 (1980). In a joint report, the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary spoke
out in favor of a bill that would authorize administrative regulations, such as rule 2(e), providing for discipline of attorney practitioners. See id.; see also S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 203(a), 125 CONG. REC. 1415 (1979) (bill amending Administrative Procedure Act to allow
administrative agencies to discipline attorney practitioners for unethical or improper conduct). The ABA has, in the wake of the Carterproceedings, ceased attacking the legitimacy
of rule 2(e) and begun attacking the legitimacy of the Carter minimum conduct standard.
See ABA Statement, supra note 112, at 24, col. 2-3; see also infra text accompanying notes
192-99 (ABA attorney practitioner disciplinary proposals).
...
See S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess, 125 CONG. REC. 1415 (1979). If passed, S. 262 would
have amended the Administrative Procedure Act to allow any administrative agency to
promulgate a disciplinary measure such as rule 2(e). Id. at S 203, 125 CONG. REc. 1415 (1979).
' See MODEL RULES OF FEDERAL AGENCY DISCIPLINE rule 2 (Proposed Final Draft 1981;
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT rule 1.13 (Discussion Draft 1980); see also Block &

Barton, Securities Litigation:Attorneys' Responsibilities-ProfessionalEthics and the Federal
Securities Laws, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 333, 342-48 (1981) (discussing ABA Model Rules).
"I See generally MODEL RULES OF FEDERAL AGENCY DISCIPLINE (Proposed Final Draft

1981).
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jurisdiction in the federal district courts to discipline attorney practitioners
who appear before administrative agencies."4 The Model Rules of Federal
Agency Discipline provide for the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to determine minimum levels of professional conduct
for attorney practitioners after considering the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility and specialized agency requirements. 9 ' Under the
Model Rules of Federal Agency Discipline, state bar associations would
prosecute all disciplinary actions and the SEC, like other agencies, would
act only as a complaining witness. 9 ' Second, the ABA's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline has proposed a new set of Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 97 which would increase the potential disciplinary
liabilities of attorney practitioners.'98 Under the proposed Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, corporate attorneys would owe an increased
obligation to the public to disclose client illegalities to the appropriate
policing agency or face disciplinary action." Two commentators have suggested that the standard imposed by the Model Rules of Federal Agency
Discipline'is equivalent to the Carter minimun conduct standard."'
While the ABA is amenable to increasing the potential disciplinary

...See id. rule 2 (jurisdiction of federal district court to hear cases involving attorney
misconduct before administrative agencies); see also Greene, supra note 7, at 4, col. 4 (SEC
supports rule 2 of Model Rules of Federal Agency Discipline).
See MODEL RULES OF FEDERAL AGENCY DISCIPLINE rule 2 (provision allowing United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to determine minimum standards of conduct for attorney practitioners). See generally Block & Ferris, supra note 32, at 526 n.135.
"I See MODEL RULES OF FEDERAL AGENCY DISCIPLINE rule 4 (right of state bar associations to prosecute cases involving misconduct of attorney practitioners); see also Greene,
supra note 7, at 4, col. 4 (SEC supports rule 4 of the Model Rules of Federal Agency Discipline).
"I See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980).

...
See id. rule 1.13 (ethical obligations of corporate attorney). Rule 1.13(b) provides
that an attorney representing a corporate client has an affirmative duty to report corporate
illegalities to the highest authority within the corporation and to report the illegalities
to the appropriate administrative agency should the highest corporate authority refuse
to take curative action. Id.; see Wilczek, CorporateAttorneys Face Dilemma in Rulings on
Duties and Loyalties, 186 N.Y.L.J. 113 at 44, col. 2-4 (Dec. 14, 1981) (discussing rule 1.13).
"I See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT rule 1.13(b) (duty of corporate attorneys
to disclose client illegalities). The New York State Bar Association has attacked rule 1.13
and has claimed that the rule, by making disclosure obligatory instead of optional, forces
the corporate attorney into the role of policeman and "whistle blower." See Draft Comments of New York Bar Association Special Committee on ABA Model Rules Proposals,
reprintedin 8 SEC. REG. L.J. at 347 (1980).
' See Block & Barton, supra note 192, at 348. By providing for disciplinary action
against attorney practitioners who do not report client illegalities to the proper authorities,
rule 1.13 requires attorney practitioners to disclose the same information the willful aiding
and abetting clause of rule 2(e) requires. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
rule 1.13(b) (requiring disclosure to protect corporate client's ultimate interest and to avoid
disciplinary sanction) with 17 C.F.R. S 201.2(e)(1)(iii) (requiring disclosure or resignation to
avoid rule 2(e) aider and abettor liability). See generallyBurke, The Duty of Confidentiality
and Disclosing CorporateMisconduct, 36 Bus. LAw. 239, 254-55 (1981).
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liability of member attorneys" and apparently has acquiesced to the validity of rule 2(e), 2°2 the ABA vehemently objects to the Carter minimum
standard of conduct for attorney practitioners. 20 3 The ABA denies that
the SEC possesses authority to promulgate a standard of practitioner conduct and argues that the Commission lacks the expertise to determine
what constitutes unethical professional conduct. 2 4 Both ABA contentions
are correct. 25 Even if the Commission can establish the validity of rule
2(e) by demonstrating that the SEC posseses inherent, implicit, or adjunctive authority to discipline attorney practitioners, the Commission cannot establish the validity of the Carter conduct standard. 6
Although many parties today acquiesce in or expressly accept the
1 See supratext accompanying notes 192-99 (ABA proposals to increase attorney practitioner disciplinary liability).
See ABA Statement, supra note 112, at 24, col. 2-3. After the SEC issued the Carter
decision, the ABA refrained from contesting the statutory validity of rule 2(e) and chose
to attack only the authority of the SEC to promulgate the Carterminimum conduct standard. See id.; see also Amicus Brief of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association [hereinafter cited as ABA Amicus Brief] at 20-21,
In re Carter, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-15797 (Feb. 28, 1981),
reprintedin [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 at 84,145 (ABA admission that rule 2(e) may be valid and proper administrative rule).
0 See Ranii, supra note 112, at 5, col. 4 (ABA opposes Carter standard); ABA Statement, supra note 112, at 24, col. 2-3 (ABA argument against Carter standard).
20 See ABA Statement, supra note 112, at 24, col. 2-4.
See id. at 24, col. 2-3. The SEC's four arguments in support of the rule 2(e)'s validity
do not support the validity of the Carterminimum conduct standard. See supratext accompanying notes 123-46 (inherent authority argument); supra text accompanying notes 147-73
(implicit authority argument); supra text accompanying notes 174-82 (adjunctive authority
argument); supra text accompanying notes 183-88 implied ratification argument). The Carter
standard is not necessary to maintain integrity in SEC administrative processes because
the standard, unlike rule 2(e), does not purport to provide for disciplinary sanctions in the
event of attorney practitioner noncompliance. See supra text accompanying notes 123-46
(inherent authority argument). The Carterstandard is not an administrative rule or regulation and therefore cannot be a necessary and appropriate agency promulgation. See supra
text accompanying notes 147-73 (implicit authority argument). The Carter standard is not
reasonably related to the realization of any statutory purpose contained in the 1934 Act
and conflicts with the plenary right afforded state bar associations to promulgate ethical
standards. See supra text accompanying notes 174-82 (adjunctive authority argument). Finally,
because the Commission has created the Carterstandard only recently, Congress has yet
to consider the propriety of the standard or to ratify the standard by implication. See supra
text accompanying notes 183-88 (implied ratification argument). In -addition, although the
SEC may possess over 40 years of experience in policing securities markets, the SEC has
absolutely no experience or expertise in defining ethical standards. See ABA Amicus Brief,
supra note 202, at 25 (SEC has no expertise in defining ethical standards); Dolin, supra
note 7, at 366 (same).
' See supra note 202 (SEC cannot use arguments that purport to support rule 2(e)'s
validity to support the Carter conduct standard). The SEC could argue, however, that the
Carterstandard merely defines what action constitutes willful aiding and abetting pursuant
to rule 2(e)(1l(iii) and is not an ethical conduct standard. Thus, the SEC could argue that
the Carterstandard removes the inherent vagueness in rule 2(e) and is a valid clarification
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validity of rule 2(e), the existence of rule 2(e)'s statutory basis remains

in doubt.0 7 The issue pertaining to rule 2(e)'s statutory basis, however,
probably will not appear as a question before either the full Commission
or the federal bench as long as the present SEC administration under
Chairman Shad remains in office."' Under Chairman Shad, the SEC has
reduced dramatically the number of rule 2(e) proceedings brought against
attorney practitioners.2 °9 Following a recommendation by the SEC General
Counsel,21 the Shad Commission has referred many potential rule 2(e) proceedings to state bar associations and has avoided many potential attacks
upon rule 2(e)'s validity.' Above all, the SEC has not yet brought a rule
2(e) proceeding against an attorney practitioner alleging a violation of the
Carter conduct standard.212 Opponents of the SEC's ethical norm for attorney practitioners and of SEC disciplinary authority in general may very
well emerge victorious from any forthcoming litigation involving the validity of the Carter appeal minimum standard of conduct." 3
J.

RANDALL MINCHEW

of an already valid rule. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (rule 2(e) vagueness
problems).
"I See R.S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMIS(1982) 172-183, 192 (ToucheRoss and Carterdid not establish
validity of rule 2(e)).
228 See Matthews & Thompson, supra note 111, at 29, col. 1-2. Under Chairman Shad,
the SEC has shifted the primary focus of its disciplinary activity from attorney practitioners
to broker-dealers. Id.
I See id. (reduction in rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys under Chairman Shad
during 1981 and 1982); Interview with SEC CommissionerLongstreth, 15 SEC. REC. & L. REP.
(BNA) 566, 570 (Mar. 18, 1983) (same); see also, SEC, Faced With Tight Budget, Is Paring
"Peripheral"DefendantsFrom Complaints, supra note 114, at 6, col. 1-2. (discussing reduction in rule 2(e) proceedings).
210 See Remarks of Edward F. Greene, General Counsel of the SEC, to the New York
Lawyers' Association, SEC DiscipinaryProceedingsAgainst Lawyers Reviewed, supra note
7, at 1, col. 2 (SEC should refer most potential rule 2(e) cases to state bar associations for
disciplinary action).
"' See Matthews & Thompson, supra note 111 at 45 n.10 (SEC, during 1981-82 period,
referred many potential rule 2(e) cases to state bar associations); see also Hudson, SEC Goes
Easieron Accountants, Relying More on Self-Regulation, supra note 114, at 29, col. 3-6 (SEC,
during 1981-82 period, referred many potential rule 2(e) cases involving accountants to state
CPA societies and A.I.C.P.A.).
"I See 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 66,107 at 59,056-57.2 (SEC had not instituted rule 2(e)
proceedings under the Carterconduct standard as of February 2, 1983). But see Interview with
SEC CommissionerLongstreth, supranote 209, at 570 (SEC had "very long pipeline" of Carter
conduct standard cases under investigation as of Mar. 18, 1983).
13 See Dolin, supra note 7, at 372-73 (Carterconduct standard is invalid administrative
promulgation); ABA Statement, supra note 112, at 25, col. 3-4 (suggesting that Carter conduct standard may not withstand judicial scrutiny); supra note 205 (explaining invalidity
of Carter conduct standard).
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